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Abstract
This paper analyzes from an axiomatic point of view a recent proposal
for counting citations: the value of a citation given by a paper is inversely
proportional to the total number of papers it cites. This way of fraction-
ally counting citations was suggested as a possible way to normalize cita-
tion counts between fields of research having different citation cultures. It
belongs to the “citing-side” approach to normalization. We focus on the
properties characterizing this way of counting citations when it comes to
ranking authors. Our analysis is conducted within a formal framework that
is more complex but also more realistic than the one usually adopted in
most axiomatic analyses of this kind.
Keywords: bibliometric ranking of authors, field normalization, fractional
counting of citations, axiomatization.
1 Introduction
With the increasing use of bibliometric indices for evaluation and monitoring pur-
poses, there are many situations in which one has to compare papers, authors,
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research units, journals belonging to different fields of research (see, e.g., Ruiz-
Castillo and Costas, 2014). But each field of research has its own “citation cul-
ture”. Without trying to be exhaustive, elements of the culture of a field include:
i) its more or less complete coverage by bibliometric database, ii) its growth rate,
iii) its tendency to import citations from or to export citations to other fields,
iv) its size, v) its publication intensity, i.e., the typical number of papers published
per year, vi) its citation intensity, i.e., the typical length of the list of references
in a publication, vii) the tendency to publish research in other outlets than peer-
reviewed journals, viii) the existence of journals specialized in publishing review
papers, ix) its co-authorship practices, x) the length of the period during which a
paper published is usually cited.
This makes the problem of “normalization” between fields a difficult but impor-
tant challenge: it is well-known that comparing citations counts in Mathematics
with citations counts in Biology is inherently difficult (Amin and Mabe, 2000).
Although this is an old theme (Schubert and Braun, 1986, 1996) in the biblio-
metric literature, there has been a recent increase in the literature devoted to this
question. Two main paths have been followed to tackle the question1.
The first path (sometimes called “a posteriori” normalization or “cited-side”
normalization) consists in comparing citation counts with what is observed (usu-
ally, on average) in the field. This requires to have at hand a delineation of fields.
This is not as obvious as it may seem at first sight (see, e.g., van Raan, 2004,
2005, Small and Sweeney, 1985, Waltman and van Eck, 2012a, Waltman, van Eck,
and Noyons, 2010). For instance, some papers (authors, journals) will be at the
border between two fields. Moreover, the adequate granularity of this partition
into fields is not easy to determine. Even worse, important differences may exist
within what is usually considered to be a field (van Eck, Waltman, van Raan,
Klautz, and Peul, 2013, Franceschini and Maisano, 2014). This line of research
has recently been revived by the debate about “universality of citations distribu-
tions” (Radicchi, Fortunato, and Castellano, 2008, Waltman, van Eck, and van
Raan, 2012b) and has generated numerous empirical studies (Abramo, Cicero,
and D’Angelo, 2012, Albarra´n, Crespo, Ortun˜o, and Ruiz-Castillo, 2011, Born-
mann and Daniel, 2009, Crespo, Li, and Ruiz-Castillo, 2013, Crespo, Herranz, Li,
and Ruiz-Castillo, 2014, Li and Ruiz-Castillo, 2013, Li, Radicchi, Castellano, and
Ruiz-Castillo, 2013, Radicchi and Castellano, 2012b, Ruiz-Castillo, 2012, Ruiz-
Castillo and Waltman, 2015) (see also the debate around the “crown indicator” of
1As pointed out to us by a referee, the work of Kaur, Ferrara, Menczer, Flammini, and
Radicchi (2015), extending Crespo, Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, and Ruiz-Castillo (2012), can be seen as a
third path to tackle the question. It is based on the comparison between a given set of papers and
carefully chosen sets of papers of the same size, obtained via simulation. This path concentrates
on the “quality” of a set of papers of a given size. It should be adapted before it can be used for
the comparison of sets of papers of different sizes, as we do here.
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the Leiden group (CWTS) and the references cited in Section 6 on this subject).
Nonparametric approaches based on percentiles have also been investigated (Born-
mann, 2013, Bornmann, Leydesdorff, and Mutz, 2013, Leydesdorff and Bornmann,
2012, Leydesdorff, Bornmann, Mutz, and Opthof, 2011). All approaches relating
to this first path require to be able to allocate papers to fields.
The second path was suggested by Zitt and Small (2008) and Zitt (2010, 2011)
for ranking journals (see also Pinski and Narin, 1976, Small and Sweeney, 1985,
Zitt, Ramanana-Rahary, and Bassecoulard, 2005). It is referred to as “citing-
side”, “a priori”, or “source” normalization. Compared with the above approches,
its does not require the a priori division of research into fields. The normalization
is performed based on the “referencing behavior of citing publications or citing
journals” (Waltman and van Eck, 2013a, p. 834). Following Waltman and van
Eck (2013a,b), who reformulate proposals often made for journals in terms of
publications, it is possible to distinguish three main techniques belonging to this
second path.
This first one is similar to the audience factor proposed by Zitt and Small
(2008). The citations emitted by a paper have a weight that is inversely propor-
tional to the average number of citations emitted by papers published in the same
journal and in the same year.
The second technique in this category consist in the “fractional counting of
citations” proposed in Leydesdorff and Opthof (2010a,b) and Gla¨nzel, Schubert,
Thijs, and Debackere (2011). For each paper p citing a paper q, the “value” of
this citation is inversely proportional to the total number of citations made by
the paper p. Leydesdorff and Opthof (2010a) suggest using all references for the
computation of this index. Waltman and van Eck (2013a,b) use only “active”
references, i.e., references pointing to a paper in the database within a given time-
window. They argue that, since the coverage of fields in bibliometric database is
uneven, considering all references may penalize fields with a low coverage.
The third technique is similar to the Source Normalized Impact per Paper
(SNIP) proposed by Moed (2010) and revised in Waltman, van Eck, van Leeuwen,
and Visser (2013). The value of a citation emitted by a paper is inversely propor-
tional to the product of the number of active references made by this paper with
the proportion of papers published in the same journal and in the same year as
this paper having at least one active reference.
This paper is only concerned with fractional counting of citations. It is de-
scribed in Leydesdorff and Opthof (2010a, p. 2367, col. 2) as “simple and elegant”
and in Leydesdorff, Radicchi, Bornmann, Castellano, and de Nooy (2013a, p. 2300,
col. 1) as a “radicalized” version of the other techniques. There has been a number
of empirical studies on fractional counting of citations. Although some of them give
evidence in its favor (Leydesdorff and Shin, 2011, Leydesdorff, Zhou, and Born-
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mann, 2013b, Zhou and Leydesdorff, 2011), others lead to a less positive picture
(Bornmann and Marx, 2015, Leydesdorff et al., 2013a, Radicchi and Castellano,
2012a, Ruiz-Castillo, 2014, Waltman and van Eck, 2013a,b).
Our interest in “fractional citation counts” lies in the fact that it is a new
way of counting citations that is simple and seems intuitive. A much related
idea can also be found in the literature on “domination” in social networks. The
“β measure” proposed in van den Brink and Gilles (2000, 2002) is indeed quite
reminiscent of fractional counting with links having a dual interpretation: if a
node p dominates a node q, this raises the domination score of p by a factor that
is inversely proportional to the number of nodes dominating q. Moreover, this
idea is also at work in PageRank (see Page and Brin, 1998: in this algorithm,
the probability that a “random surfer” goes from page p to page q is inversely
proportional to the number of outgoing links in page p. It should be noted that
this idea and, more generally, the underlying algorithm was anticipated by Pinski
and Narin, 1976, in the context of ranking journals).
Our aim in this paper is to contribute to a formal study of the properties of
fractional counting of citations. This will allow us to analyze the pros and cons of
this particular way to count citations from a formal point of view. As in Bouyssou
and Marchant (2010), the framework that we use is rich, i.e., much richer2 than
a framework in which each author is viewed as a collection of papers each having
received a certain number of citations as done, e.g., in Bouyssou and Marchant
(2011b), Marchant (2009a,b), Quesada (2010), or Woeginger (2008a). We will
concentrate on bibliometric rankings instead of bibliometric indices. We study
bibliometric rankings of authors instead of bibliometric rankings of journals, as
done, e.g., in Bouyssou and Marchant (2011a), Zitt and Small (2008) and Zitt
(2010, 2011). We acknowledge the fact that librarians often have to take subscrip-
tions decisions concerning journals coming from different fields. But, comparing
authors coming from different fields is also a common practice, e.g., when deciding
on promotions3.
Since our emphasis is on the formal properties of a particular counting method
2As pointed out to us by a referee, our framework, although rich, does not include a temporal
dimension that would allow us to say that a paper p is written before paper q and that, therefore,
q cannot cite p.
3As pointed out to us by a referee, the question of ranking authors is closely related to the one
of ranking research groups (or universities). Indeed, authors will be viewed here as sets of papers.
Clearly a similar view can be adopted for research groups. Hence our analysis may also prove
useful in this case. Let us however note that the hypothesis made below that all papers have a
unique author is less realistic when dealing with research groups. Moreover, in our analysis the
ranking of an author will never deteriorate following the publication of a new paper, even if this
paper performs poorly in terms of citations. It is not entirely obvious that this hypothesis is also
adequate for research groups and that size-independent rankings (in the sense of Waltman and
van Eck, 2012b, p. 408) are always adequate in this case.
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used as a tool for ranking, there are many important bibliometric problems that
we will not consider. For instance, our analysis starts with a given citation graph.
Hence, we suppose that we have solved before our analysis the question of the
choice of an adequate time window, the choice of the publications to include in
this graph (see the problem of trade and profesional magazines in Waltman and
van Eck, 2013a, Zitt and Small, 2008). Moreover, when starting with a citation
graph, as we do here, all references are supposed to be “active” in the sense of Zitt
and Small (2008) and Waltman and van Eck (2013a). Another limitation of this
paper is that it does not contain empirical analysis. Hence, we do not deal with
the delicate problem of defining what a satisfactory field normalization is (on this
point, see Zitt, 2011, Zitt and Cointet, 2014) and how to test it in practice (see
Sirtes, 2012 and Waltman and van Eck, 2013a, Appendix C).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our setting and introduces
the rankings that we will study. Section 3 introduces our conditions on bibliometric
ranking functions. Section 4 is devoted to the ranking based on fractional citation
counts. Section 5 is devoted to the ranking based on citation counts. Section 6
concludes.
2 Notation and Setting
The set of non-negative integers is denoted by N. We define N+ = N \ {0}. The
number of elements of a finite set Θ will be denoted by |Θ|.
2.1 Setting
We use the general framework introduced in Bouyssou and Marchant (2010). We
simplify this framework by not taking journals into account. Moreover, in order
to keep things simple, we will not deal with co-authors and we will suppose that
each paper has a unique author. A proper treatment of co-authors would require
using techniques similar to the ones presented in Bouyssou and Marchant (2010).
Including this point in this paper would result in much complexity, while trying
to solve a question that seems rather independent from the one analyzed here4.
The set of authors is denoted by A. It is fixed and finite. We will suppose
throughout that |A| ≥ 3. The set of all papers is denoted by P . When a ∈ A is
the author of p ∈ P , we write a S p, i.e., a Signs p. Hence, S is a binary relation
between the sets A and P , i.e., a subset of A×P . A paper p ∈ P may cite other
papers in P . When p ∈ P cites q ∈ P , we write p C q, i.e., p Cites q (we write
4However, Waltman and van Eck (2015) have recently argued that the way to take coau-
thors into account is of importance to evaluate field normalization techniques (see also Perianes-
Rodriguez and Ruiz-Castillo, 2015)
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p 6C q as an abbreviation for Not[p C q]). Hence, C is a binary relation on P ,
i.e., a subset of P ×P . Although we shall suppose throughout that A is fixed and
finite, we shall allow the set of papers P and, hence, S and C to vary5.
A bibliometric profile G on A is a triple (P , S, C) with S ⊆ A×P , C ⊆ P×P ,
such that:
• for all p ∈ P , there is a unique a ∈ A such that a S p (i.e., each paper p has
a unique author a),
• there is no cycle6 of any length in C (because a paper can only cite older
papers).
A bibliometric ranking function (brf) on A is a mapping % associating with
each bibliometric profile G on A a weak order %(G) on A. As is usual, we respec-
tively denote by (G) and ∼(G) the asymmetric and symmetric parts7 of %(G).
The statement a %(G) b (resp. a (G) b and a ∼(G) b) means that, for the biblio-
metric profile G, author a has a performance that is not worse than (resp. superior
to and equivalent to) the performance of b.
In order to simplify notation, given a profile G, we denote by PG(a) the set of
all papers signed by a ∈ A, i.e.,
PG(a) = {p ∈ P : a S p}.
Similarly, given a profile G, the set of all papers in P cited by p ∈ P is denoted
OCG(p) (Out Citations), i.e.,
OCG(p) = {q ∈ P : p C q}.
The set of all papers in P citing p ∈ P is denoted ICG(p) (In Citations), i.e.,
ICG(p) = {q ∈ P : q C p}.
Finally, for p ∈ P , we will sometimes use the notation S−1(p) to denote the author
a ∈ A such that a S p.
5The way in which the set P is allowed to vary is not completely formalized here. The simplest
way to do so (following what is done in the study of voting rules with a varying population, see,
e.g., Young, 1974) would be to consider a countably infinite universe of papers U that can be
identified with N. The admissible sets of papers P would then be all finite subsets of this universe
U .
6A cycle of length ` ≥ 1 in the relation C consists in ` papers p1, p2, . . . , p` such that p1 C p2,
p2 C p3, . . . , p`−1 C p`, p` C p1.
7A weak order on a set is a complete (a % b or b % a, for all a, b) and transitive binary relation
(a % b and b % c imply a % c, for all a, b, c) on this set. The asymmetric part (resp. symmetric
part) of a relation % is a relation  (resp. ∼) such that a  b ⇔ [a % b and Not[b % a]] (resp.
a ∼ b⇔ [a % b and b % a]).
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Remark 1
Our setting has relations with the classical problem of ranking objects on the basis
of a binary relation between these objects (see, e.g., Bouyssou, 2004, Dutta and
Laslier, 1999, Laslier, 1997, Rubinstein, 1980, Schwartz, 1972). There are however
important differences that prevent us from simply recycling known results. We
want to compare authors but a bibliometric profile does not give a binary relation
on the set of authors. In our setting, authors are compared on the basis of a
binary relation (the citing relation) on the set of papers. Another relation (the
signing relation) links papers and authors. Moreover, the citing relation which
is the basis of our analysis is supposed to be without any cycle. This sharply
contrasts with the setting of the papers mentioned above. The relation on the set
of objects that they consider is usually complete and may have cycles, e.g., being
a tournament on this set (i.e., a complete and antisymmetric binary relation, in
view of the classical result of McGarvey, 1953). The citing relation is without any
cycle and is obviously incomplete (see however Ko´czy and Strobel, 2007, for the
use of techniques coming from the literature on tournaments for the ranking of
journals).
The papers that come closer to our analysis are the papers devoted to the study
of the β domination measure (van den Brink and Gilles, 2000, 2002). However,
these papers do not suppose that the underlying graph is without any cycle and do
not involve a notion of “author”. Moreover, they study the index given by the β
domination measure and not the ranking that it induces. Similar remarks apply to
the papers devoted to the study of the ranking that PageRank induces on the set
of pages from an axiomatic point of view (Altman, 2005, Altman and Tennenholtz,
2005). Notice that in our setting the citation graph that is used is not valued. This
contrasts with the setting used by Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) and Demange
(2014) for the study of iterative ranking procedures for journals. In these papers a
link between journals j and j′ carries a valuation that is interpreted as the number
of citations from j to j′. •
Remark 2
Our proofs will often lead us to consider changes in the citation relation. We leave
to the reader the, easy, task of checking that the changes that we will consider will
never create cycles in this relation. We will not stress this point in what follows.
We are fully aware that the hypothesis that the graph we use is without any
cycle is not always satisfied: in practice, papers being elaborated simultaneously
can cite each other. We nevertheless maintain it because we feel that it is a crucial
feature of citations graphs when compared to other “social network” graphs. More-
over, in practice, cycles in the citing relation only involve a very small percentage
of all papers. Most of our analysis does not crucially depend on this hypothesis.
At the cost of minor modifications of our axioms, all results presented below can
be extended to cover the case of citation graphs having cycles. •
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2.2 Definitions
2.2.1 Ranking based on citations
We may want to rank authors based on the number of citations that their papers
receive. This is a standard bibliometric index (see, e.g., van Raan, 2006). It has
been studied from an axiomatic point of view by Marchant (2009a) and Bouyssou
and Marchant (2014), using a setting that is different from the one used here. This
leads to associating with each profile G = (P , S, C) on A and with each author
a ∈ A the index:
fc(a,G) =
∑
p∈PG(a)
|ICG(p)|.
The index fc records for each paper p signed by author a (i.e., p ∈ PG(a)) the
number of citations received by p (i.e., the cardinality of the set ICG(p)). These
numbers are then added to give the score of author a for the bibliometric profile
G, i.e., fc(a,G). Authors are then ranked according to the values of fc, i.e., for all
profiles G on A and all a, b ∈ A,
a %c(G) b⇔ fc(a,G) ≥ fc(b,G).
As discussed above, a weakness of this way to rank authors is that it does not take
the specific characteristics of “fields” into account.
2.2.2 Ranking based on normalized citations
This ranking involves a “local” normalization of citations: the field of a paper p
is the set of all papers citing it. For each paper q citing a paper p, the “value” of
this citation is inversely proportional to the total number of citations made by the
paper q (see Gla¨nzel et al., 2011, Leydesdorff and Opthof, 2010a). Formally, this
leads to associating with each profile G = (P , S, C) on A and with each author
a ∈ A the index:
fn(a,G) =
∑
p∈PG(a)
 ∑
q∈ICG(p)
1
|OCG(q)|
 ,
(we use the convention that summing over an empty index set gives the value
0). The index fn works as follows. For each paper p authored by author a (i.e.,
p ∈ PG(a)), we consider the set of papers q citing p (i.e., the papers q ∈ ICG(p)).
If the paper q citing p gives k citations, the index considers that the value of the
citation from q to p is 1/k. These values are computed for all papers citing p and
are then added to give the contribution of paper p to the standing of its author.
Doing so for each paper p authored by a, we finally add up these numbers to
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compute the score of author a in the profile G, i.e., fn(a,G). Authors are then
ranked according to the values of fn, i.e., for all profiles G on A and all a, b ∈ A,
a %n(G) b⇔ fn(a,G) ≥ fn(b,G).
The aim of this paper is to give conditions characterizing the brf %n. We
will do the same for %c so as to have a point of comparison. Although there are
other characterizations of %c (see Bouyssou and Marchant, 2010) and Bouyssou
and Marchant (2014), Marchant (2009a), these works use settings that are different
from the one used here (see Section 6). The one used in Bouyssou and Marchant
(2014), Marchant (2009a) is simpler than the one used here and does not allow to
tackle the question of field normalization. The one used in Bouyssou and Marchant
(2010) is more complex since it also involves journals and co-authors. This added
complexity implies using more involved conditions.
3 Conditions on bibliometric ranking functions
This section introduces and discusses a number of conditions that a brf may
possess. The first three of them are classical.
Our first condition is author anonymity. It roughly says that the way in which
authors are labelled does not influence the ranking. In particular, if two authors
a and b exchange their papers, everything else being kept unchanged, they should
exchange their positions in the ranking. This condition is clearly satisfied by %n.
Indeed, starting with the initial profile G, let us define the profile H by exchanging
the papers signed by a and b. It is clear that we have fn(a,G) = fn(b,H) and
fn(b,G) = fn(a,H), while, for all c ∈ A \ {a, b}, fn(c,G) = fn(c,H).
A1 (Author Anonymity) Let G = (P , S, C) and a, b ∈ A. Consider now the
profile H = (P , S∗, C) that is identical to G, except that PG(a) = PH(b) and
PG(b) = PH(a). Then, we have a %(G) b⇔ b %(H) a.
Consider a profile G and two authors a and b. Suppose that a brf leads to
declare that a is not worse than b (resp. a better than b). Let us now consider
a profile that is identical to G except that a paper signed by a has received an
additional citation (we suppose that this addition citation does not create cycles
in the citation relation). In this new profile G∗, using the same brf as before,
we expect that a remains not worse than b (resp. better than b). It is easy to
check that this is the case with both %n and %c. This property is a classical
monotonicity condition. We shall need a stronger version of this condition. In G∗,
we would like a to be ranked strictly above b. This is the case with %c, as can
easily be checked. But this fails with %n. If the citation that is added to one paper
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signed by a is coming from a paper that previously only cited papers signed by a,
it is clear that, with fn, the score of a does not change. In order to ensure that
a is now strictly above b, we have to impose a constraint on the papers originally
cited by the paper giving the additional citation. This condition is called strong
monotonicity. It is the only one of our conditions that will delineate cases in which
an author is ranked strictly above another one.
A2 (Strong Monotonicity) Let G = (P , S, C) and a, b ∈ A. Let p, q ∈ P such
that q ∈ PG(a), p 6C q and q 6C p. Let H = (P , S, C∗) be a profile such that
C∗ \ C = {(p, q)}. If a %(G) b (resp. a (G) b) then a %(H) b (resp. a (H) b).
Moreover, if a %(G) b and either OCG(p) = ∅ or there is r ∈ OCG(p) such
that r /∈ PG(a), then a (H) b.
Strong monotonicity is satisfied by %n. Indeed, if, starting with the profile G,
we define the profile H by the addition of a citation to a paper signed by a, we
have: fn(a,H) ≥ fn(a,G), while, for all c ∈ A \ {a}, fn(c,H) ≤ fn(c,G). The
inequality fn(a,H) ≥ fn(a,G) becomes strict if we impose that the additional
citation comes from a paper that, previously, did not cite only papers signed by a.
Our next condition deals with the fact that we want to rank authors on the
basis of the citations received by the papers they sign and not on the basis of the
number of papers they sign. It says that if two profiles G and H only differ by
the addition of a paper that does not cite any other paper and is not cited by
any paper, we will call such papers dummy papers, then the ranking of all authors
should remain the same. Among all our conditions, it is the only one that involves
changes to the set of papers in the profile. This condition is clearly satisfied by
%n. Indeed if, starting with a profile G, we obtain the profile H by the addition
of a dummy paper, we have fn(c,H) = fn(c,G), for all c ∈ A.
A3 (Dummy Paper) Let G = (P , S, C), a ∈ A, and v /∈ P. Consider now the
profile H = (P∗, S∗, C) with P∗ = P ∪ {v} and S∗ = S ∪ {(a, v)}. Then, we have
%(G) = %(H).
The next three conditions are slightly more complex.
Consider two papers r and s. Suppose that these two papers do not receive
any citation. Suppose furthermore that each of them cites k papers. Intuitively, it
seems that the value of the citations emitted by r and s are quite similar: both are
uncited and cite the same number of papers. Our next condition formalizes this
similarity. It says that if two papers r and s are uncited and if both cite k ∈ N+
papers, then, if the paper p, signed by a, is cited by r and does not cite any paper,
and if the paper q, signed by b, is cited by s and does not cite any paper, the
two citations (from r to p and from s to q) can be exchanged without altering the
position of a with respect to (henceforth, w.r.t.) b in the ranking. Said differently,
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all citations coming from uncited papers citing the same number of papers have
the same impact. This condition is clearly satisfied by %n. Indeed if, starting with
a profile G, we obtain the profile H by exchanging citations coming from uncited
papers giving the same number of citations, we have fn(c,H) = fn(c,G), for all
c ∈ A. The name of this condition has been chosen so as to avoid any confusion
with the condition called Source Independence used in Bouyssou and Marchant
(2010, p. 362).
A4 (Restricted Source Independence) Let G = (P , S, C), and p, q, r, s ∈ P be
such that ICG(r) = ICG(s) = ∅, |OCG(r)| = |OCG(s)|, r C p, s C q, r 6C q,
s 6C p, OCG(p) = OCG(q) = ∅. Consider now the profile H = (P , S, C∗) that is
identical to G, except that r 6C∗ p, s 6C∗ q, r C∗ q, and s C∗ p. Then, we have
%(G) = %(H).
The next condition says that if a paper is uncited and does not cite any paper
signed by authors a and b, we can delete a citation from this paper to any paper
it cites, without altering the relative position of authors a and b in the ranking.
This condition is clearly satisfied by %n. Indeed, suppose that the profile G is
such that there is a paper p that does not cite any paper signed by a or by b.
Deleting a citation from the paper p to any paper that is not signed by a or by
b defines the profile H. It is easy to check that we have fn(a,H) = fn(a,G) and
fn(b,H) = fn(b,G).
A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations) Let G = (P , S, C) and a, b ∈ A. Let
p ∈ P be such that ICG(p) = ∅ and, for all r ∈ OCG(p), a 6S r and b 6S r. Let
q ∈ OCG(p). Consider now the profile H = (P , S, C∗) that is identical to G except
that p 6C∗ q. Then, we have a %(G) b⇔ a %(H) b.
The above condition would be violated by a brf in which a local modification
of the citation graph may have consequences that are not only “local”, e.g., if the
performance of the author of a paper influences the value of a citation made by
this paper.
It is not difficult to check that all conditions introduced so far are satisfied
not only by %n but also by %c. Hence, in order to characterize %n, we need
conditions that are satisfied by %n but are violated by %c. It turns out that only
one additional condition will be needed.
Consider a profile G in which an uncited paper p cites ` papers q1, q2, . . . , q`.
For each qj ∈ OCG(p), let us suppose that there are k ∈ N+ papers qj1, qj2, . . . , qjk,
all signed by the same author as qj and that are not cited by p. Consider now
the profile H that is identical to G, except that, for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `} and for
all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, we have added a citation from p to qji . It is clear that such
a modification can only affect the values of fn for authors signing papers that
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were initially cited by p. But, it is easy to see that this modification does not
affect these values. Indeed, supposing that k = 1, the value of each of the original
citations has been divided by 2, while each of them has been duplicated. Hence,
we have, for all a ∈ A, fn(a,H) = fn(a,G).
A6 (Citation Intensity Independence) Let G = (P , S, C) and p ∈ P. Let k ∈ N+.
Suppose that ICG(p) = ∅ and OCG(p) = {q1, q2, . . . , q`}. Suppose furthermore
that, for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `}, there are qj1, qj2, . . . , qjk ∈ P that are all signed
by the same author as qj and that are not cited by p. Consider now the profile
H = (P , S, C∗) that is identical to G except that, for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `} and all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, we have added a citation from p to qji . Then, we have %(G) =
%(H).
4 Characterization of %n
4.1 Result
The conditions introduced so far allow us to characterize the brf %n.
Theorem 1
A brf % on A satisfies conditions A1–A6 iff % = %n.
The necessity of the six conditions was discussed above. The proof of sufficiency
is given in the next subsection. We will also show that the conditions used above
are independent: omitting any one of them invalidates the result.
4.2 Sufficiency proof of Theorem 1
Let us start with a simple lemma showing that, without altering the ranking, a
citation emitted by an uncited paper to a paper p can be transferred to another
paper q signed by the same author as p.
Lemma 1
Suppose that a brf % satisfies A3 (Dummy Paper) and A6 (Citation Intensity
Independence). Let G = (P , S, C). Let r ∈ P such that ICG(r) = ∅. Let H =
(P , S, C∗) be a profile that is identical to G, except that, for some a ∈ A and some
p, q ∈ P, we have: a S p and a S q, r C p and r 6C q, r C∗ q and r 6C∗ p. Then,
we have %(G) = %(H).
Proof
Let r ∈ P be such that ICG(r) = ∅. Consider the set of all papers cited by
r ∈ P , i.e., OCG(r). By construction, we know that p ∈ OCG(r) and q 6∈ OCG(r).
Suppose that OCG(r) = {p, t1, t2, . . . , t`} with ` ∈ N.
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Using A3 (Dummy Paper), we duplicate all papers in OCG(r) \ {p}, to create
the papers t∗1, t∗2, . . . , t∗` (t∗j is signed by the same author as tj. It does not give
or receive citations). For this new profile G1, we have %(G) = %(G1).
We then use A6 (Citation Intensity Independence) applied with k = 1 to the
paper r. In the profile G2 that we obtain, r cites p, q, and, for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `},
tj and t∗j. For this new profile G2, we have %(G1) = %(G2).
Starting from G2, consider now the profile G3 in which the citation from r to
p has been suppressed as well as all citations from r to the papers t∗j. Using A6
(Citation Intensity Independence), we obtain %(G3) = %(G2).
In the profile G3, the papers t
∗j are dummy papers. We can suppress them,
using A3 (Dummy Paper). This leads to the profile G4 and we know that %(G4) =
%(G3). It is easy to see that G4 = H, which completes the proof. 2
Proof of Theorem 1
Let us consider a bibliometric profile G = (P , S, C) on A. Take a, b ∈ A with
a 6= b. Because we have supposed that |A| ≥ 3, let us choose c ∈ A \ {a, b}.
Step 1. We build a profile G1 such that % ranks all authors as in G and in which
a paper either cites other papers or is cited by other papers but not both.
Because we have supposed that the citation graph is without any cycle, there
is a paper p ∈ P such that ICG(p) = ∅.
If OCG(p) = ∅, paper p is a dummy paper. Using A3 (Dummy Paper), we
can suppress it from P .
Otherwise, using A3 (Dummy Paper), we duplicate all the papers in OCG(p) (a
duplicate is signed by the same author as the duplicated paper. A duplicate does
not cite any paper and is not cited by any paper). Using Lemma 1, we transfer
each citation from p to the papers in OCG(p) to the duplicated papers. The paper
p that was uncited in G is said to have been processed.
In either case, the new citation graph that we have built is still without any
cycle. Hence there must exist an unprocessed paper from the original set of papers
that is uncited. We then repeat the above operations. We do so until we have
processed all papers in the original set of papers. This defines the profile G1. The
ranking of a w.r.t. b in G1 is the same as in G.
Notice that in G1, a paper is either a sender (cites other papers but is not
cited) or a receiver (is cited by other papers but does not cite any paper). By
construction, all receivers are cited by a unique sender. •
Step 2. We build a profile G2 in which all senders are signed by c.
Consider a sender p in G1 that is not signed by c. Using A3 (Dummy Paper),
we duplicate p as well as all papers in OCG1(p) (all these duplicates are signed by
c). Using A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations), we can add a citation from
the duplicate of p to the duplicate of papers in OCG1(p). Using A4 (Restricted
13
Source Independence), we can exchange the citations emitted by p and the citations
emitted by its duplicate. Using A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations), we can
suppress all citations emanating from p. The duplicate of the papers in OCG1(p)
as well as p are now dummy papers. We can suppress them, using A3 (Dummy
Paper).
Repeating the above operations for all senders in G1 defines the profile G2.
The ranking of a w.r.t. b in G2 is the same as in G1. •
Step 3. We build a profile G3 in which all senders cite the same number of papers.
In G2, we compute the number of citations given by each sender. Let K be
the least common multiple (henceforth, l.c.m.) of all these numbers (any common
multiple could be used). We use A3 (Dummy Paper) to create dummy papers
signed by c. We then use A6 (Citation Intensity Independence) to transform this
profile into a profile in which all senders cite exactly K papers. Note that, since
we may create as many dummy papers signed by c as we wish, we can do this in
such a way that each receiver is cited by exactly one sender. This creates a new
profile G3 in which the ranking of a w.r.t. b is the same as in G2. •
Step 4. We build a profile G4 in which all receivers are signed by a, b, or c.
Consider a receiver in G3 that is signed by an author that does not belong to
{a, b, c}. We use A3 (Dummy Paper) to create K + 1 dummy papers all signed
by c. Using A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations), we add citations from one
of these new papers to the K other new papers. Using A4 (Restricted Source
Independence), we can exchange the citation to the receiver not signed by a, b or
c that we are processing with a citation to one of the new receivers signed by c.
Once this is done, we use A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations) to suppress
the citations from the new sender signed by c to the K − 1 receivers signed by c
and to the receiver not signed by a, b or c that we are processing. After this is
done, all these papers become dummy papers and we can suppress them, using A3
(Dummy Paper). All these operations do not alter the ranking of a w.r.t. b. They
lead to a decrease in the number of receivers not signed by a, b or c by one unit.
We then repeat these operations until all receivers are signed by a, b or c.
This defines the profile G4. In this profile, all senders are signed by c. They
all cite exactly K receivers. All receivers are signed by a, b or c. They all receive
exactly one citation. In G4, the ranking of a w.r.t. b is the same as in G3. •
Step 5. We build a profile G5 in which each sender cites at least K − 1 papers
signed by c.
In G4, there may exist senders citing papers signed by a and at the same time
papers signed by b or several papers signed by a or b. Using A3 (Dummy Paper)
and A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations), we can add to this profile as many
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senders signed by c citing K receivers signed by c as we wish. We can therefore
use A4 (Restricted Source Independence) to obtain a profile in which each sender
cites: (i) one paper signed by a and K − 1 papers signed by c, or (ii) one paper
signed by b and K − 1 papers signed by c, or (iii) K papers signed by c.
This defines the profile G5. In G5, the ranking of a w.r.t. b is the same as in
G4. •
Suppose now that, in the initial profile G, we had fn(a,G) = fn(b,G). Let us
show that we must have a ∼(G) b.
It is easy to see that, in the profile G5, the total number of citations received
by papers signed by a is equal to the total number of citations received by papers
signed by b.
Step 6. With G5, we have a profile that is symmetric w.r.t. a and b. There are
a number of senders signed by c citing only one receiver signed by a and K − 1
receivers signed by c. There are exactly the same number of senders citing only
one paper signed by b and K−1 receivers signed by c. All other senders are signed
by c and cite K receivers signed by c.
To each sender, signed by c, citing one receiver signed by a and K−1 receivers
signed by c, we can associate a sender, signed by c, citing one receiver signed by
b and K − 1 receivers signed by c. These two senders have different names, as
well as all the papers that they cite. Using A3 (Dummy Paper), A4 (Restricted
Source Independence), and A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations), the name
of the senders and the receivers is immaterial. Using A1 (Author Anonymity), the
identity of the authors a and b is irrelevant for ranking them. Hence, they must
be ranked equally.
Let us detail this step of reasoning. Consider a sender p citing K − 1 receivers
signed by c and the receiver q signed by a. Consider furthermore a sender p∗ citing
K − 1 receivers signed by c and the receiver q∗ signed by b.
Let us show that in the profile in which everything is unchanged, except that q
is signed by b and q∗ is signed by a, the ranking of a w.r.t. b is unchanged. This is
done as follows. Using A3 (Dummy Paper), we create a paper v signed by a and a
paper v∗ signed by b. Using Lemma 1, we can transfer the citation from p to q to
v and the citation from p∗ to q∗ to v∗. In this new profile, the papers q and q∗ do
not send or receive citations. Using A3 (Dummy Paper), they can be suppressed
from the profile. Using A3 (Dummy Paper) again, we create the paper q∗ signed
by a and the paper q signed by b. Using Lemma 1, we can transfer the citation
from p to v to q∗ and the citation from p∗ to v∗ to q. After these transfers, the
papers v and v∗ do not send or receive citations. Using A3 (Dummy Paper), we
can therefore suppress them from the profile. Hence, we obtain a profile in which p
cites K−1 receivers signed by c and the receiver q∗ signed by a and p∗ cites K−1
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receivers signed by c and the receiver q signed by b. The ranking of a w.r.t. b in
this new profile is the same as in the original one. Since p and p∗ are uncited and
both cite K papers, we can use A4 (Restricted Source Independence) to exchange
the citation from p to q∗ and the citation from p∗ to q. The ranking of a w.r.t. b
in this new profile is the same as in the original one.
The above operations can be applied to all pairs of senders, the first one citing
one paper signed by a and the second one citing one paper signed by b. Once
these operations have been applied, we use A1 (Author Anonymity) to exchange
the papers signed by the authors a and b. This exchanges the position of a and b
in the ranking. This leads to the profile from which we started at the beginning of
Step 7. Hence, in the initial profile, a and b must belong to the same equivalence
class.
This shows that a and b must be ranked equally in G5. Hence, they must also
be ranked equally in G, i.e., a ∼(G) b. •
Suppose now that in the initial profile G we had fn(a,G) > fn(b,G). Let us
show that we must have a (G) b, which will complete the proof.
It is easy to see that, in G5, the number of citations to papers signed by a is
greater than the number of citations to papers signed by b.
Step 7. Consider the profile G5. Let x be the number of citations to papers signed
by a minus the number of citations to papers signed by b in this profile.
We can decrease the number of citations to papers by a in G5, without changing
its structure, so that the papers signed by a and b receive the same total number
of citations. More precisely, this is done as follows. We first create, using A3
(Dummy Paper), x new receivers all signed by c. We then replace x citations to
papers signed by a by citations to these new receivers. This creates x dummy
papers signed by a.
We know that, in this modified profile, a and b are equally ranked.
Take one of the x dummy papers signed by a that we have just created. Let
us call it p. We have previously replaced the citation from a sender, called s and
signed by c, to p by a citation from s to a new receiver signed by c, called v. In
this profile we know that a and b belong to the same equivalence class. Using A5
(Independence of Irrelevant Citations), we can suppress the citation from s to v,
without affecting the position of a w.r.t. b in the ranking. The paper v signed
by c is now a dummy paper. We can suppress it, thanks to A3 (Dummy Paper),
without altering the ranking of a w.r.t. b. We now add a citation from s to p.
Using A2 (Strong Monotonicity), we must have a strictly above b in this profile.
Repeating this process for the x dummy papers signed by a created at the
beginning of this step, shows that in G5 and, hence, in G, a must be ranked
strictly above b. •
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This completes the proof. 2
4.3 Independence of the conditions in Theorem 1
We give here examples showing that the conditions used in Theorem 1 are inde-
pendent.
Example 1 (A1 (Author Anonymity))
Choose z ∈ A. Consider the brf such that, for all bibliometric profiles G on A,
and all a, b ∈ A,
a %(G) b⇔ g(a,G) ≥ g(b,G),
with
g(a,G) =
{
fn(a,G) if a 6= z,
2fn(a,G) if a = z.
Condition A1 (Author Anonymity) is violated. It is easy to check that all other
conditions hold. 3
Example 2 (A2 (Strong Monotonicity))
It is easy to check that the brf always returning a weak order having one equiva-
lence class violates A2 (Strong Monotonicity). All other conditions trivially hold.3
Example 3 (A3 (Dummy Paper))
Consider the brf such that, for all bibliometric profiles G on A, and all a, b ∈ A,
a %(G) b⇔ g(a,G) ≥ g(b,G),
with
g(a,G) = fn(a,G) + |PG(a)|.
The brf is based on an index that adds up the score fn(a,G) with the number of
papers |PG(a)| of each author a ∈ A. It is clear that this brf violates A3 (Dummy
Paper). It is simple to check that all other conditions hold. 3
Example 4 (A4 (Restricted Source Independence))
Consider the brf such that, for all bibliometric profiles G on A, and all a, b ∈ A,
a %(G) b⇔ g(a,G) ≥ g(b,G),
with
g(a,G) =
∑
p∈PG(a)
 ∑
q∈IC ′G(p)
1
|OCG(q)| +
∑
q∈IC ′′G(p)
1
2|OCG(q)|
 ,
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where
IC ′G(p) = {q ∈ P : q C p and S−1(q) 6= S−1(p)},
IC ′′G(p) = {q ∈ P : q C p and S−1(q) = S−1(p)}.
This brf is close to %n but treats self-citations differently from other citations. It
is clear that this brf violates A4 (Restricted Source Independence).
For instance, let A = {a, b, c} and G = (P , S, C) a bibliometric profile on A
with P = {p, q, r, p∗, q∗, r∗}. Suppose that the signing relation S is such that:
PG(a) = {p, q∗, r∗}, PG(b) = {p∗}, and PG(c) = {q, r}. Suppose finally that the
citing relation C is such that: q C p, r C p, q∗ C p∗, r∗ C p∗. It is easy to check
that we have a ∼(G) b.
Consider now the profile H = (P , S, C∗) that is identical to G, except that the
citation relation is now such that: q∗ C∗ p, r C∗ p, q C∗ p∗, r∗ C∗ p∗. It is easy to
check that we have b (G) a, violating A4 (Restricted Source Independence).
All other conditions trivially hold. 3
Example 5 (A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations))
Given a profile G = (P , S, C). Let us consider a real-valued function h(p,G) such
that h(p,G) = 0 if OCG(p) = ∅ and h(p,G) =  if OCG(p) 6= ∅ with  < 1/|P|.
Consider the brf such that, for all bibliometric profiles G on A, and all a, b ∈
A,
a %(G) b⇔ g(a,G) ≥ g(b,G),
with
g(a,G) =
∑
p∈PG(a)
 ∑
q∈ICG(p)
1
|OCG(q)|
− h(p,G)
 .
This brf violates A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations). For instance,
let A = {a, b, c} and G = (P , S, C) a bibliometric profile on A such that P =
{α1, α2, β1, β2, γ, p, q}.
Suppose that the signing relation S is such that:
PG(a) = {p},
PG(b) = {q},
PG(c) = {α1, α2, β1, β2, γ}.
Suppose finally that the citing relation C is such that:
α1 C p, α2 C p,
β1 C q, β2 C q.
It is easy to check that we have a ∼(G) b. If we define the profile H = (P , S, C∗)
in which C∗ is identical to C, except that we have added a citation from p to γ to
G, we obtain b (H) a.
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It is not difficult to check that all other conditions are satisfied. For instance,
A6 (Citation Intensity Independence) is satisfied because citations that are added
in this condition are sent by papers that already cite other papers. Hence, for
these papers, the function h(p,G) does not change. Because the function h(p,G)
is always strictly less that 1/|P|, the addition of a citation from a paper signed
by a to another paper signed by a always improves g(a,G). Hence, A2 (Strong
Monotonicity) is always satisfied. A4 (Restricted Source Independence) is satisfied
because this condition leaves unchanged the number of citations given and received
by all papers. 3
Example 6 (A6 (Citation Intensity Independence))
It is easy to check that the brf %c violates A6 (Citation Intensity Independence).
It is easy to check that all other conditions hold. 3
5 Characterizations of %c
5.1 Result
We already observed that the brf %c satisfies all conditions in Theorem 1, except
A6 (Citation Intensity Independence). The following condition is satisfied by %c
but is violated by %n. It says that the ranking of two authors is not altered if one
paper of each of these two authors receives one additional citation, coming from
uncited papers signed by a third author. This condition is clearly satisfied by %c.
Indeed, if G is the profile before the modification and H is the profile after the
modification, we clearly have that fc(a,H) = fc(a,G) + 1, fc(b,H) = fc(b,G) + 1
(while, fc(c,H) = fc(c,G), for all c ∈ A \ {a, b}).
A7 (Independence of Added Citations) Let G = (P , S, C). Let a, b, c ∈ A be
distinct authors and take r, s ∈ P such that ICG(r) = ICG(s) = ∅, c S r, and
c S s. Take p ∈ PG(a) and q ∈ PG(b). Consider now the profile H = (P , S, C∗)
that is identical to G except that C∗ \ C = {(r, p), (s, q)}. Then, we have a %(G)
b⇔ a %(H) b.
Replacing A6 (Citation Intensity Independence) with A7 (Independence of
Added Citations) in Theorem 1 leads to a result characterizing %c.
Theorem 2
A brf % on A satisfies conditions A1–A5 and A7 iff % = %c.
The necessity of the six conditions was discussed above. The proof of suffi-
ciency is given in the next subsection. As above, we will also show that the above
conditions are independent.
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5.2 Sufficiency proof of Theorem 2
Let us consider a bibliometric profile G = (P , S, C) on A. Take a, b ∈ A with
a 6= b. Because we have supposed that |A| ≥ 3, let us choose c ∈ A \ {a, b}.
Step 1. We build a profile G1 in which each paper is either a sender or a receiver.
In G1, all senders are signed by c and cite a unique receiver. All receivers are signed
either by a or by b and are cited by a unique sender.
Because we have supposed that the citation graph is without any cycle, there
is a paper p ∈ P such that ICG(p) = ∅.
If OCG(p) = ∅, paper p is a dummy paper. Using A3 (Dummy Paper), we
can suppress it from P .
If p does not cite any paper signed by a or by b, we can use A5 (Independence
of Irrelevant Citations) to remove all citations emanating from p. The paper p
becomes a dummy paper that can be suppressed, using A3 (Dummy Paper).
Suppose that among the papers cited by p there is a paper q signed by a. For
definiteness, suppose that the author of p is d ∈ A.
We will show that the citation from p to q may be deleted and replaced by a
citation from a paper p′ signed by c to a paper q∗ signed by a. The paper p′ will
be a sender citing a single paper (q∗). The paper q∗ will be a receiver cited by a
single paper (p′).
Using A3 (Dummy Paper), we create four dummy papers p∗ and p∗∗ signed
by d, q∗ signed by a, and q∗∗ signed by b. Using A7 (Independence of Added
Citations) we add a citation from p∗ to q∗ and a citation from p∗∗ to q∗∗. Using A7
(Independence of Added Citations), we can suppress the citation from p to q and
the citation from p∗∗ to q∗∗. The two papers p∗∗ and q∗∗ become dummy papers
and can be suppressed, using A3 (Dummy Paper).
At this stage, we have replaced the citation from p, signed by d, to q, signed
by a, by a citation from p∗, signed by d, to q∗, signed by a.
Using A3 (Dummy Paper), we now create two dummy papers p′ and q′ signed
by c. Using A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations), we can add a citation from
p′ to q′ without changing the position of a w.r.t. b in the ranking. We then use
A4 (Restricted Source Independence) to exchange the citation from p∗ to q∗ with
the citation from p′ to q′, without altering the ranking. Using A5 (Independence
of Irrelevant Citations), the citation from p∗, signed by d, to q′, signed by c, can
be suppressed without altering the ranking of a w.r.t. b. Once this is done, p∗ and
q′ become dummy papers and can be suppressed, using A3 (Dummy Paper).
Summarizing, we have replaced the citation from p∗, signed by d, to q∗, signed
by a, by a citation from p′, signed by c, to q∗, signed by a. Note that, in this
process, the paper q does not necessarily become a dummy paper because it is not
excluded that it was cited by more than one paper in the original profile. It will
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become a dummy paper when all the papers citing it and belonging to the original
set of papers will have been processed.
We can repeat this process for all papers cited by p that are signed by a. Clearly
the same operations can be performed for all papers cited by p that are signed by
b.
In the end, the paper p will only cite papers not signed by a or by b. All these
citations can be suppressed, using A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations). After
this is done, the paper p becomes a dummy paper and can be suppressed.
The new citation graph that we have built is still without any cycle. It is easy
to check that in this graph there must exist a paper from the original set of papers
that is uncited. We then repeat the above operations for this uncited paper. We
do so until we have processed all papers in the original set of papers. This defines
the profile G1. The ranking of a w.r.t. b in G1 is the same as in G.
Notice that in G1, a paper is either a sender (cites other papers but is not
cited) or a receiver (is cited by other papers but does not cite any paper). By
construction, all senders are signed by c. A sender cites a unique receiver. The
receivers are cited by a unique sender. All receivers are signed either by a or by
b. •
Suppose now that, in the initial profile G, we had fc(a,G) = fc(b,G). Let us
show that we must have a ∼(G) b.
It is easy to see that, in the profile G1, the total number of citations received
by papers signed by a is equal to the total number of citations received by papers
signed by b.
Step 2. Repeatedly using A7 (Independence of Added Citations), we can remove
from G1 all citations to papers signed by a and to papers signed by b. This does
not alter the ranking of a w.r.t. b. After this is done, all papers become dummy
papers. We use A3 (Dummy Paper) to suppress them. This creates the profile G2
in which the set of papers is empty. The ranking of a w.r.t. b in G2 is the same as
in G1.
Using A1 (Author Anonymity), we can then exchange the papers signed by a
with the papers signed by b in G2. Since these two authors do not sign any paper,
the resulting profile is identical to G2. This shows that, in G2, a and b must belong
to the same equivalence class. Hence, in G also, a and b must belong to the same
equivalence class. •
Suppose now that, in the initial profile G, we had fc(a,G) > fc(b,G). Let us
show that we must have a (G) b, which will complete the proof.
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It is easy to see that, in the profile G1, the total number of citations received
by papers signed by a is strictly larger than the total number of citations received
by papers signed by b.
Step 3. Using exactly the same reasoning as in Step 7 of the proof of Theorem 1
shows that we must have a ranked strictly above b. •
This completes the proof. 2
5.3 Independence of the conditions in Theorem 2
We give examples showing that the conditions used in Theorem 2 are independent.
Example 7 (A1 (Author Anonymity))
Choose z ∈ A. Consider the brf such that, for all bibliometric profiles G on A,
and all a, b ∈ A,
a %(G) b⇔ g(a,G) ≥ g(b,G),
with
g(a,G) =
{
fc(a,G) if a 6= z,
2fc(a,G) if a = z.
Condition A1 (Author Anonymity) is violated. It is easy to check that all other
conditions hold. 3
We know that the brf in Example 2 satisfies A1 (Author Anonymity), A3
(Dummy Paper), A4 (Restricted Source Independence), and A5 (Independence of
Irrelevant Citations) but violates A2 (Strong Monotonicity). It is easy to check
that it satisfies A7 (Independence of Added Citations).
Example 8 (A3 (Dummy Paper))
Consider the brf such that, for all bibliometric profiles G on A, and all a, b ∈ A,
a %(G) b⇔ g(a,G) ≥ g(b,G),
with
g(a,G) = fc(a,G) + |PG(a)|.
It is clear that this brf violates A3 (Dummy Paper). All other conditions trivially
hold. 3
Example 9 (A4 (Restricted Source Independence))
Consider the brf such that, for all bibliometric profiles G on A, and all a, b ∈ A,
a %(G) b⇔ g(a,G) ≥ g(b,G),
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with
g(a,G) =
∑
p∈PG(a)
[|IC ′G(p)|+ 12 |IC ′′G(p)|].
where, as before,
IC ′G(p) = {q ∈ P : q C p and S−1(q) 6= S−1(p)},
IC ′′G(p) = {q ∈ P : q C p and S−1(q) = S−1(p)}.
This brf violates A4 (Restricted Source Independence). For instance, let A =
{a, b, c} and G = (P , S, C) a bibliometric profile on A with P = {p, q, r, p∗, q∗, r∗}.
Suppose that the signing relation S is such that: PG(a) = {p, q∗, r∗}, PG(b) = {p∗},
and PG(c) = {q, r}. Suppose finally that the citing relation C is such that: q C p,
r C p, q∗ C p∗, r∗ C p∗. It is easy to check that we have g(a,G) = 2 and
g(b,G) = 2, so that a ∼(G) b.
Consider now the profile H = (P , S, C∗) that is identical to G, except that the
citation relation is now such that: q∗ C∗ p, r C∗ p, q C∗ p∗, r∗ C∗ p∗. It is easy to
check that we have g(a,G) = 1.5 and g(b,G) = 2, so that b (G) a, violating A4
(Restricted Source Independence).
It is simple to check that all other conditions hold. For instance, A7 (Indepen-
dence of Added Citations) holds, since in this condition, the additional citations
to papers signed by a and b always come from papers signed by a third author c.3
Example 10 (A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations))
Take a profile G = (P , S, C). Consider the brf such that, for all bibliometric
profiles G on A, and all a, b ∈ A,
a %(G) b⇔ g(a,G) ≥ g(b,G),
with
g(a,G) =
∑
p∈PG(a)
[
|ICG(p)| − h(p,G))
]
.
where h(p,G) is the function that was used in Example 5.
This brf violates A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations). For instance,
let A = {a, b, c} and G = (P , S, C) a bibliometric profile on A such that P =
{α1, α2, β1, β2, γ, p, q}.
Suppose that the signing relation S is such that:
PG(a) = {p},
PG(b) = {q},
PG(c) = {α1, α2, β1, β2, γ}.
23
Suppose finally that the citing relation C is such that:
α1 C p, α2 C p,
β1 C q, β2 C q.
It is easy to check that we have a ∼(G) b. If we define the profile H = (P , S, C∗)
that is identical to G, except that we have added a citation from p to γ, we obtain
b (H) a.
It is not difficult to check that all other conditions are satisfied. For instance, A7
(Independence of Added Citations) is satisfied because this condition does not alter
the number of papers signed by a and by b and leaves unchanged the citations that
these papers give to other papers. Because the function h(p,G) is always strictly
less than 1, the addition of a citation from a paper signed by a to another paper
signed by a always improves g(a,G). Hence, A2 (Strong Monotonicity) is always
satisfied. A4 (Restricted Source Independence) is satisfied because this condition
leaves unchanged the number of citations given and received by all papers. 3
Example 11 (A7 (Independence of Added Citations))
It is easy to check that the brf %n violates A7 (Independence of Added Citations).
Theorem 1 has shown that all other conditions hold. 3
Remark 3
The characterization presented in Theorem 2 was designed with the constraint to
use as many conditions already used in Theorem 1 as possible. Indeed, Theorems 1
and 2 both use six conditions and have five conditions in common. This comes at a
price however. Indeed, the bibliometric ranking based on the number of citations
is rather simple and more direct characterizations of %c can be envisaged. For
space reasons, we do not develop this point here. •
6 Discussion
6.1 Setting
Most of the literature devoted to the formal properties of brfs use a setting dif-
ferent from the one used here8. In these papers (see, e.g., Bouyssou and Marchant,
8The differences between our setting and the more classical one is reminiscent of the distinction
between multi-profile and single-profile approaches in Social Choice Theory. A classic example of
a multi-profile setting is Arrow (1963). An example a single-profile approach is Roberts (1980).
As pointed out to us by a referee, analogies with Social Choice Theory could be pushed even
further. Handling authors from several fields is not unlike aggregating votes that are made in
several electoral districts: votes (resp. citations) given in different districts (resp. fields) may not
be given the same “worth”.
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2011b, 2014, Chambers and Miller, 2014, Deineko and Woeginger, 2009, Hwang,
2013, Kongo, 2014, Marchant, 2009a,b, Miroiu, 2013, Quesada, 2009, 2010, 2011a,b,
Woeginger, 2008a,b) an author a is viewed as a mapping from N to N. For x ∈ N,
the value a(x) is the number of publications of author a with exactly x citations.
The set of all authors is then the set of all such functions a for which
∑
x∈N a(x)
is finite.
In the setting used in the papers mentioned above, the set of authors is infinite
and contains all possible conceivable authors. Moreover, it does not allow one to
distinguish citations based on the name of citing paper or based on the name of
the author of the citing paper. This setting makes it impossible to formulate a
condition like A4 (Restricted Source Independence). A condition resembling the
weakening of condition A2 (Strong Monotonicity) evoked in Section 3 and requiring
that if a is judged not worse than b, it remains so after the addition of a citation to
a paper signed by a, is taken to be part of the definition of a bibliometric ranking
in most texts (see, e.g., Bouyssou and Marchant, 2014, Woeginger, 2008a). The
conditions corresponding to A1 (Author Anonymity), A3 (Dummy Paper) and
A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations) reformulated in this setting are not
automatically satisfied. However, in this setting, brfs that violate them are quite
contrived.
The framework that we use here (that is a simplified version of the one used
in Bouyssou and Marchant, 2010) is more detailed and it allows conditions A1
(Author Anonymity), A3 (Dummy Paper), A4 (Restricted Source Independence),
and A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations) to have a real bite. It is more
complex than the usual setting but is also probably more realistic: when we look
at a bibliometric database, what we have is a given profile G and not the set of all
potential authors.
6.2 Conditions
Our two main results both use six conditions. They have in common five condi-
tions A1 (Author Anonymity), A2 (Strong Monotonicity), A3 (Dummy Paper), A4
(Restricted Source Independence), and A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations).
Let us now analyze in more detail these conditions in our setting.
Condition A1 (Author Anonymity) seems unavoidable. Abandoning it would
mean that some authors have an advantage because they possess a distinctive
characteristic feature (e.g., their name). This would be the case with a brf always
ranking authors according to the lexicographic order of their last name. Needless
to say that such brfs have little to bring to the field. We are not aware of any
sensible brf that would violate this condition.
Condition A2 (Strong Monotonicity) is a rather stringent monotonicity condi-
tion. It says that adding one adequate citation is always sufficient to break a tie in
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the expected direction. A bibliometric ranking based on the h-index (Hirsch, 2005)
or on the number of papers signed by an author (Marchant, 2009a) would violate
it. Its weakening evoked in Section 3 seems, on the contrary, rather innocuous.
Condition A3 (Dummy Paper) is satisfied by most brfs that are of common
use. The only classical brf that violates this condition is the one based on the
number of papers. The limitations of such a way of ranking authors should be
clear.
Condition A4 (Restricted Source Independence) seems rather innocuous. It is
satisfied by all brfs that are of common use (e.g., all those studied in Bouyssou
and Marchant, 2014). It is violated by ranking methods in which self-citations are
not treated as ordinary citations.
Condition A5 (Independence of Irrelevant Citations) also seems innocuous.
Indeed, it is satisfied by all brfs that are of common use (e.g., all those studied
in Bouyssou and Marchant, 2014). It is violated by ranking methods in which
the position of the author of the citing paper in the ranking has an influence on
the value of citations made, e.g., ranking methods in which a citation coming
from a highly ranked author has more “value” than a citation coming a lowly
ranked author (see, e.g., West, Jensen, Dandrea, Gordon, and Bergstrom, 2013).
This includes all brfs a` la PageRank. The application of such recursive ranking
methods have been the subject of many studies in the recent years (see Fragkiadiki
and Evangelidis, 2014, Waltman and Yan, 2014, for overviews). The case of the
evaluation of journals has received special attention (Demange, 2014, Palacios-
Huerta and Volij, 2004, Pinski and Narin, 1976).
Hence, the five conditions that are common to our two results appear rather
reasonable. Let us now turn to the two remaining conditions.
Condition A6 (Citation Intensity Independence) is probably the most complex
and the least simple to justify. We like to think of it in the following way. Suppose
that the editor of a journal requires all papers published in this journal to cite not
only the published version of the cited papers but also their last working paper
version on a given Working Paper Repository9. It is difficult to imagine why
such a requirement, however weird, should influence the ranking of authors. Our
condition A6 (Citation Intensity Independence) with k = 1 requires less, since it
only applies to uncited papers. The requirement of the editor of the journal may
be interpreted as a local increase in citation intensity. All papers published in
this journal will double the number of citations they make. A condition saying
that this should have have no impact on the ranking of all authors does not seem
unreasonable.
To motivate Condition A6 (Citation Intensity Independence) for all k ∈ N+
9E.g., arXiv (http://arxiv.org/), RePEc (http://repec.org/), or SSRN (http://www.
ssrn.com/).
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(and not just for k = 1 as in the previous example), we can think of the following
situation. Suppose author a writes paper p and considers she has to cite papers
q1, q2, q3, and q4 because all four are essential for a good understanding of paper
p and of its contribution to the field. Suppose now, for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, that bj
(the author of qj) has also written qj1, q
j
2 and q
j
3 on the same topic as q
j. Author
a considers qj1, q
j
2 and q
j
3 as relevant, but to a lesser extent. Depending on the
tradition in his research domain, author a will cite only q1, q2, q3, and q4 (profile
G) or those four plus some of the papers qji .
If a cites q1, q2, q3, q4, and q11 (profile G
∗), the local citation intensity in the
local field around p increases, but it is also clear that the position of b1 in G
∗
improves with respect to the position of b2, b3, and b4. And if %(G) 6= %(G∗), we
then have no clear reason to object.
Suppose now a cites q1, q2, q3, q4 and q1i , q
2
i , q
3
i , q
4
i for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3} (profile
G∗). The relative position of b1, b2, b3, and b4 does not change, because of the
symmetry in the change from G to G∗. So the ranking of these three authors
should be the same in %(G) and in %(G∗). Since the only change in the local field
around p is the increase in citation intensity, we can also argue (as in the example
of the working paper repository) that the position of b1 (or b2 or b3 or b4) should
not change with respect to the position of any other author. In conclusion, we
should have %(G) = %(G∗).
Although A6 (Citation Intensity Independence) is not unreasonable, it is com-
plex. It would be nice to factorize it into simpler conditions that would be easier
to grasp.
We know that %c violates this requirement. It is easy to find examples showing
that it is also violated by the ranking based on the h-index or on the number of
highly cited papers.
Condition A7 (Independence of Added Citations) is satisfied by many brfs,
including some brfs that have a recursive character. Indeed, with this condition,
we add to both authors a and b a citation coming from a paper signed by the same
author c. We nevertheless saw that this condition is violated by %n because the
papers r and s both signed by c that are both giving an additional citation may
cite a different number of papers and, thus, may count differently using %n. It is
also easy to check that it is violated by the ranking based on the h-index (Hirsch,
2005) or on the number of highly cited papers (as defined, e.g., in Bouyssou and
Marchant, 2014, Waltman and van Eck, 2012b).
6.3 Directions for future research
This paper has studied bibliometric rankings but has not considered bibliometric
indices. The study of the index fn seems interesting. One may think that going
from rankings to indices is not difficult. Indeed, Bouyssou and Marchant (2014)
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have shown that, whenever two consecutive equivalence classes of the ranking are
always “equally spaced” in terms of the index, a characterization of the index
is easily derived from a characterization of the ranking. This is not so here, for
at least two reasons. First, in our setting, the profile G under study may not
contain authors belonging to all consecutive equivalence classes, contrary to what
happens when the set of authors contains all possible conceivable authors (as in
Bouyssou and Marchant, 2014). Second, even if this could be ensured, consecutive
equivalence classes of%n are not equally spaced in terms of fn. Hence the axiomatic
study of fc would require further research. We think that the analysis developed
in this paper may nevertheless be useful for doing so.
With %n, the weight of a citation given by a paper q is inversely proportional
to |OCG(q)|. Whereas it seems sensible to choose a weight that decreases with
|OCG(q)|, the choice of this particular decreasing function is clearly more open
to debate. In fact, the brf %n is a member of a more general family of brfs in
which the weight of a citation given by paper q is equal to w(|OCG(q)|), with w a
nonincreasing function from N+ to the nonnegative reals. A study of this family
of rankings is a research question that seems promising.
Other variants can be considered. Consider, e.g., two papers q and q∗ giving
the same number of citations. With the brf %n, all these citations have the same
weight. This seems open to discussion if, e.g., we know that q is cited by many
papers but that q∗ is not. In such a case, we would like the citations given by q to
have more weight. This suggests another family of brfs in which the weight of a
citation given by q would be equal to w∗(|ICG(q)|, |OCG(q)|) where w∗ would be
nondecreasing in its first argument and nonincreasing in its second argument.
Another potentially interesting extension would be to use fn “recursively”, e.g.,
using a ranking that would be based on the following index:
f (2)n (a,G) =
∑
p∈PG(a)
 ∑
q∈ICG(p)
fn(S
−1(q), G)
|OCG(q)|
 ,
in which the “value” of an author a is first computed as fn(a,G) and then each
paper signed by a divides this value equally among all the papers that it cites10.
This would bring us closer to the rankings a` la PageRank (see, for the case of
journals, Demange, 2014, Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2004, Pinski and Narin, 1976;
see also Slutzki and Volij, 2005, 2006).
10One may think of distributing, instead of the value associated with the author, the value
associated with each paper, as given by fn. Because the citation graph is without any cycle,
this does not work without some adaptation. Indeed, papers that are uncited will have a null
value and this null value will propagate to the whole set of papers. A possible solution to this
problem, as suggested to us by a referee, is to associate a minimal positive to each paper on top
of the value given by fn, that could be interpreted as the “value of being published”.
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6.4 Final comments
We mentioned in Section 1 that there are many different ways to perform a field-
normalization, keeping in line with the idea of “citing-side” normalization. We
have only investigated one of them. Furthermore, we have concentrated on the
formal properties of the ranking induced by the index fn and we have mentioned
that our setting conceals many important empirical problems (choice of an ade-
quate time window, choice of the “core journals”, in the sense of Waltman and van
Eck (2013a), discussion of the criteria for judging the appropriateness of a given
normalization, ease of computation of the underlying index, avoidance of potential
manipulation of the index by authors and editors of journals, etc.). These quite
important points are left open by the present paper.
In view of the heated discussions around the “crown indicator” used by the
Leiden group (CWTS) (Bornmann, 2010, Bornmann and Mutz, 2011, Gingras
and Larivie`re, 2011, Larivie`re and Gingras, 2011, Leydesdorff and Opthof, 2011a,
Lundberg, 2007, Opthof and Leydesdorff, 2010, 2011, van Raan, van Leeuwen,
Visser, van Eck, and Waltman, 2010, Waltman, van Eck, van Leeuwen, Visser,
and van Raan, 2011a,b,c, Waltman, Calero-Medina, Kosten, Noyons, Tijssen, van
Eck, van Leeuwen, van Raan, Visser, and Wouters, 2012a) and around the SNIP in-
dicator (Leydesdorff, 2013, Leydesdorff and Opthof, 2011b, Mingers, 2014, Moed,
2010, 2011, Waltman et al., 2013), we nevertheless think that the discussion of
the formal properties of a ranking method is a useful exercise. Indeed, intuitively
appealing formulas giving empirically meaningful results may be plagued by disap-
pointing behavior in certain situations. Axiomatic analyses like the one proposed
here may help detecting such problems.
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